Dissertation: “Clenching the Fists of Dissent”: Political Unrest, Repression, and the Evolution to Civil War.
My dissertation offers a novel theory that explains decision-making during contentious interactions between regimes and dissidents and how these dynamic relationships may evolve into civil war. First, I argue when regimes encounter a violent challenge by dissidents, the decision to repress the political unrest or offer concessions originates from the probability of regime survival in a post-reform environment and whether the dissident activity represents a significant threat to the regime. Based on the institutional structure of the government, certain regimes (single party and military regimes) possess more options for survival if the country undergoes a transition to democracy while other regimes (monarchies and personalist regimes) depend on maintaining the political status quo in order for the regime and its leaders to survive. I find that the two groups of regimes operate in a diametrically opposed manner when faced with both nonviolent and violent challenges by the domestic population. Regimes with a low probability of survival in the aftermath of a democratic transition are more likely to perceive violent dissent as a challenge to its tenure and thus, respond with repression against the dissidents. Conversely, regimes with a high probability of survival in a post-reform environment are more likely to deliver the preferred reforms of violent dissidents and survive in the aftermath. On the other hand, if a regime with a low probability of survival faces a nonviolent dissident challenge, the state does not perceive the dissent as threatening to its tenure and provides the desired concessions of the dissidents. Finally, if a regime who can survive in the aftermath of a democratic transition faces nonviolent dissent, the costs of repressing the dissidents are much lower than giving into the desired reforms of the opposition. Therefore, the regime responds with repression of the dissidents and remains in political power. The interaction between these concepts provides a glimpse into the decision-making of regimes regarding responses to contentious challenges.
Moreover, my concentration on the dynamic relationship between belligerents continues in my examination of decision-making by the dissidents and how this impacts the progression to the onset of civil war. Building upon the findings in earlier chapters, I contend that the outcome of this relationship is influenced by the ability of the regime to survive in a post-reform environment as well as a legacy effect of regime repression. As explained above, the decision-making of the regime is significantly influenced by their calculation of the survival of the regime in the future. Dissidents, on the other hand, possess little to no information regarding the coercive capacity of the regime and therefore rely on their perception of the repressive nature of the regime from previous experiences. Therefore, the onset of civil war is a product of the decision-making by both the regime and the dissidents. If the regime is less likely to survive in a post-reform environment but has demonstrated little willingness to repress, the dissidents see an opportunity to possibly gain their preferred concessions. however, the regime calculates that if it grants the preferences of the dissidents, it would lead to the demise of the regime. Therefore, the dissidents escalate violent activity and a civil war erupts between the actors. On the other hand, if the regime is more likely to survive a democratic transition and has a low repressive legacy, the dissidents also see an opportunity to gain concessions; however, the regime determines that it will survive if concessions are provided. Thus, civil war is avoided as the regime gives in to the preferred concessions of the dissidents and both actors survive. Finally, if the regime has a low probability of survival in the aftermath of a democratic transition and has demonstrated a high willingness to repress, civil war is less likely to occur. In this manner, the dissidents will either go home in fear of future repression or if they decide to escalate violence, the political unrest will likely be successfully repressed by the regime. By interacting these concepts, I attempt to open the black box of decision-making for both actors and provide a more comprehensive understanding of why belligerents conduct themselves in a particular manner during contentious interactions.
Moreover, my concentration on the dynamic relationship between belligerents continues in my examination of decision-making by the dissidents and how this impacts the progression to the onset of civil war. Building upon the findings in earlier chapters, I contend that the outcome of this relationship is influenced by the ability of the regime to survive in a post-reform environment as well as a legacy effect of regime repression. As explained above, the decision-making of the regime is significantly influenced by their calculation of the survival of the regime in the future. Dissidents, on the other hand, possess little to no information regarding the coercive capacity of the regime and therefore rely on their perception of the repressive nature of the regime from previous experiences. Therefore, the onset of civil war is a product of the decision-making by both the regime and the dissidents. If the regime is less likely to survive in a post-reform environment but has demonstrated little willingness to repress, the dissidents see an opportunity to possibly gain their preferred concessions. however, the regime calculates that if it grants the preferences of the dissidents, it would lead to the demise of the regime. Therefore, the dissidents escalate violent activity and a civil war erupts between the actors. On the other hand, if the regime is more likely to survive a democratic transition and has a low repressive legacy, the dissidents also see an opportunity to gain concessions; however, the regime determines that it will survive if concessions are provided. Thus, civil war is avoided as the regime gives in to the preferred concessions of the dissidents and both actors survive. Finally, if the regime has a low probability of survival in the aftermath of a democratic transition and has demonstrated a high willingness to repress, civil war is less likely to occur. In this manner, the dissidents will either go home in fear of future repression or if they decide to escalate violence, the political unrest will likely be successfully repressed by the regime. By interacting these concepts, I attempt to open the black box of decision-making for both actors and provide a more comprehensive understanding of why belligerents conduct themselves in a particular manner during contentious interactions.
Research Interests
Conflict Studies
Civil Conflict and Political Violence Terrorism Human Rights and State Repression |
Revolutions and Political Unrest
Conflict Management Ethnic Politics |
Peer Reviewed Publications
"Reviewer Fatigue? Why Scholars Decline to Review their Peers' Work" (with Marijke Breuning, Jeremy Brannon, Benjamin Isaak Gross, and Michael Widmeier). P.S. Political Science and Politics. 48(4): 595-600.
“Patterns of Protest in the People's Republic of China: A Provincial Level Analysis” (with Victor Cheung Yin Chan and T. David Mason). 2014. Asian Affairs: An American Review. 41(3): 91-107.
“Reconciliation and Conceptual Complexity: The Case of Post Conflict Kenya” (with John Ishiyama). 2011. African and Asian Studies 10(4): 366-386.
“Patterns of Protest in the People's Republic of China: A Provincial Level Analysis” (with Victor Cheung Yin Chan and T. David Mason). 2014. Asian Affairs: An American Review. 41(3): 91-107.
“Reconciliation and Conceptual Complexity: The Case of Post Conflict Kenya” (with John Ishiyama). 2011. African and Asian Studies 10(4): 366-386.
Non-Peer Reviewed Publications
"Overburdened Reviewers and the Future of Peer Review." (with Marijke Breuning, Jeremy Brannon, Benjamin Isaak Gross, and Michael Widmeier). European Science Editing. 42(2): 42.
“American Foreign Policy,” 2010. In 21st Century Political Science: A Handbook, 1st edition. 2 volumes. John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, editors. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 822-830.
“American Foreign Policy,” 2010. In 21st Century Political Science: A Handbook, 1st edition. 2 volumes. John Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning, editors. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 822-830.
Working Papers
‘“Appetite for Destruction”? Institutional Survival and Political Unrest.’
‘“Legacy of Brutality”: How Low Level Political Violence Evolves into Civil War.’
'"Master of Puppets: A Study of Egypt and Syria on the Path to the Arab Spring."
"Beasts of Burden: Refugees, Economic Grievances, and Social Conflict" with Brandon Stewart and Michael Widmeier
“Does a Punishment in U.S. Foreign Aid Generate an Improvement in Human Rights Violations?”
“Female Participation in Rebel Groups” with Brooke E. DeSipio.
“Gender Violence during Civil Wars,” with Brooke E. DeSipio.
“Gender Violence during Political Unrest,” with Brooke E. DeSipio.
“Institutions and Ethnic Unrest in Emerging Democracies,” with John Ishiyama.
“Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Rebel Goals,” with Christopher Linebarger.
"Intimate Partner Violence and Civil War," with Cloe Di Flumeri and Marissa Fowler
“Political Violence and Regime Response in Africa,” with Emily Stull.
“Tools of the Trade? Methods of State Repression and Authoritarian Regimes,” with Michael Marshall and Benjamin Gross.
“Teaching International Relations,” with Emily Stull, Steven Liebel, and Michael Widmeier.
"Women as Peacemakers? The Effect of Female Legislators on Regime Repression," with Emily Stull.
‘“Legacy of Brutality”: How Low Level Political Violence Evolves into Civil War.’
'"Master of Puppets: A Study of Egypt and Syria on the Path to the Arab Spring."
"Beasts of Burden: Refugees, Economic Grievances, and Social Conflict" with Brandon Stewart and Michael Widmeier
“Does a Punishment in U.S. Foreign Aid Generate an Improvement in Human Rights Violations?”
“Female Participation in Rebel Groups” with Brooke E. DeSipio.
“Gender Violence during Civil Wars,” with Brooke E. DeSipio.
“Gender Violence during Political Unrest,” with Brooke E. DeSipio.
“Institutions and Ethnic Unrest in Emerging Democracies,” with John Ishiyama.
“Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Rebel Goals,” with Christopher Linebarger.
"Intimate Partner Violence and Civil War," with Cloe Di Flumeri and Marissa Fowler
“Political Violence and Regime Response in Africa,” with Emily Stull.
“Tools of the Trade? Methods of State Repression and Authoritarian Regimes,” with Michael Marshall and Benjamin Gross.
“Teaching International Relations,” with Emily Stull, Steven Liebel, and Michael Widmeier.
"Women as Peacemakers? The Effect of Female Legislators on Regime Repression," with Emily Stull.